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I. INTRODUCTION
An individual is involved in an automobile accident and is
arrested for driving under the influence. A few days after being re-
leased, he receives several letters in the mail. One is from a chiro-
practor offering services to treat his injuries. Another is from an
alcohol abuse treatment center. Yet another is from an attorney who
defends traffic offenses. Each of the solicitors obtained the individ-
ual's name and address from publicly available records concerning the
incident. The letters are truthful and not misleading, but utilize
publicly available information for purely commercial purposes at the
expense of the individual's privacy.
Several states have passed laws' prohibiting the commercial
use of public information in law enforcement records.2 State govern-
1. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f) (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-305.5
(1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.650(11) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-53(c) (1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-9 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.635 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 35.54 (West 1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512b (West 1993).
2. For the purposes of this Note, "law enforcement records" include police arrestee
reports, accident reports and incident reports. See Speer v. Miller (Speer 1), 15 F.3d 1007, 1009
n.3 (11th Cir. 1994) (describing types of law enforcement records that the government is re-
quired to disclose under GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(4)). "Public information" refers to any
data found in law enforcement records, particularly information used for solicitation purposes,
including the arrestee or accident victim's name, mailing address, and the details of the incident
reported. At common law, any member of the public had a right of access to public records. See
1422 [Vol. 52:1421
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ments have offered a number of reasons for such laws. The primary
reasons given include protecting the privacy interests of individuals
and improving public confidence in the legal system by discouraging
solicitation abuse.3 These statutes, however, simultaneously create
exceptions for the media and the general public.4
To illustrate this tension, imagine that the individual men-
tioned above opened the morning paper to find all of the details of the
accident and arrest on the front page.5 The statutes do nothing to
prevent other, potentially greater invasions of individual privacy.6 In
addition, the statutes restrict the non-deceptive commercial speech of
businesses that wish to provide legitimate services to recent arrestees
and accident victims.7 Thus, restrictions on commercial use of public
information in law enforcement records implicate the tension between
privacy concerns, solicitors' commercial speech rights, and public
perceptions of solicitation abuse.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) (stating that the right of
access fulfills concerns of preserving integrity of law enforcement and judicial process). This
right of access included situations where the public or the press sought access to criminal justice
records. See Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1511-12 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609). Over time, however, some state legislatures re-
placed the common law with statutes that limit access to certain public records. See, e.g., United
Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822, 825 (1996), affd sub nom., United Re-
porting Pubrg Corp. v. California Highway Patrol (United Reporting 11), 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. granted sub nom., Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 119
S.Ct. 901 (1999). See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Babkes v. Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (explaining the reasons
behind restricting commercial use of information in traffic citations as "preserving the privacy of
[Florida] citizens, in not aiding in the dissemination of information for commercial purposes, in
lessening the dangers of solicitation abuse, and in maintaining public support of the legal
profession....').
4. See United Reporting II, 146 F.3d at 1135 (state may release information for any
"scholarly, journalistic, political, or government purpose); Speer I, 15 F.3d at 1009 (information
may be used by the news media or for 'lawful data collection or analysis purpose); Babkes, 944
F. Supp. at 911 (allowing driver safety training programs to use information).
5. See, e.g., Amelkin v. Commissioner, Dep't of State Police, 936 F. Supp. 427, 429 (W.D.
Ky. 1996) (allowing information to be used in any "news-gathering organization's publication),
affd sub nom., Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 1999).
6. See Speer I, 15 F.3d at 1011 n.7 (finding privacy arguments disingenuous in light of
statutory language allowing "the media to place any information they obtain on the front page of
any newspaper in Georgia").
7. See United Reporting II, 146 F.3d at 1140 (noting that having personal information
printed in a newspaper is a much "greater affront to privacy than receiving a letter from an
attorney, substance abuse counselor, or driving school eager to help one overcome present
difficulties," even if for a fee).
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While commercial speech,8 including solicitation, is entitled to
First Amendment protection,9 it is afforded less protection than other
forms of protected speech.10 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission, the Supreme Court created a test to
determine whether restrictions on lawful, non-misleading commercial
speech are permissible." Provided that the government asserts a
substantial interest, 2 a court must determine whether the restriction
directly advances the government's asserted interest and is not more
extensive than necessary to serve the asserted interest. 13 Under this
framework, the Supreme Court has upheld several regulations on the
commercial speech of attorneys, including bans on in-person solicita-
tion and rules requiring waiting periods for direct mail advertising.14
The Court has also held that a state may not completely ban profes-
sional advertising,' 5 advertisements in newspapers, 6 or direct mail
advertising.1'
Several circuit courts, however, have split over whether re-
strictions on commercial use of information in law enforcement rec-
ords are constitutional under the commercial speech doctrine.'8 In
Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, the Tenth Circuit upheld a statute
requiring any person accessing public arrestee records to sign a
statement that the records would not be used for commercial pur-
poses. 19 The Ninth Circuit took the opposite position in United Re-
8. Commercial speech has been defined as "speech that proposes a commercial transac-
tion," Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976), or as any speech made in the speaker's economic interest. See Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-563 (1980). However, not all speech
generating commercial profit falls under the lower protection afforded commercial speech. See,
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that newspapers are not
commercial speech despite any revenue generated through their production and sale). See infra
Part IV.A.
9. See, e.g., Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 762.
10. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-563.
11. See id. at 566.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (banning in-person
solicitation); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (imposing waiting periods).
15. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
16. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
17. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
18. Compare, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1994),
with Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 1999); United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v.
California Highway Patrol (United Reporting I), 146 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); Speer v.
Miller (Speer 1), 15 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (11th Cir. 1994); Innovative Database Syss. v. Morales,
990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1993).
19. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1508.
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porting Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol.20 It held that
prohibiting commercial use of information in publicly available arrest
records was unconstitutional under Central Hudson.2 1 Similar issues
have arisen over the commercial use of public information in accident
reports.2 2 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have invalidated complete
prohibitions on commercial use of accident reports,23 while the state
supreme courts of Louisiana and South Carolina have upheld similar
restrictions. 24
This Note examines whether restrictions on commercial use of
law enforcement records directly advance the states' interests in
privacy and promoting professional standards of ethics and whether
the restrictions are more extensive than necessary to advance these
interests. Part II traces the development of the commercial speech
doctrine, analyzing Supreme Court case law up to Central Hudson,
and subsequent cases refining the Central Hudson framework. Part
III examines recent decisions on the constitutionality of such laws
under the First Amendment. In particular, it contrasts the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Lanphere with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United Reporting. Part IV analyzes three issues: whether laws re-
stricting the use of law enforcement records fall under the commercial
speech doctrine; whether they are constitutional under Central Hud-
son; and, in the alternative, whether these laws are constitutional
under a traditional time, place, and manner analysis. Finally, Part V
20. 146 F.3d 1133. See also Speer v. Miller (Speer II), 864 F. Supp. 1294, 1302 (N.D. Ga.
1994) (granting permanent injunction against restriction on commercial use of law enforcement
records).
21. See United Reporting I, 146 F.3d at 1140.
22. Compare Innovative Database Syss. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1993), and
Amelkin, 168 F.3d at 902, (6th Cir.) with Walker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 1995) and DeSalvo v. Louisiana, 624 So.2d 897 (La. 1993)). The
Sixth Circuit had previously discussed the issue without resolution. See Northern Ky. Chiro-
practic v. Ramey, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (vacating preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of a Kentucky regulation on commercial use of accident reports on abuse of discretion
grounds) (unpublished opinion). Several concurring judges disagreed on the possible constitu-
tionality of the regulation. Compare id. at *3-*4 (Nelson, J., concurring) (agreeing with the
Tenth Circuit in Lanphere that such regulations are constitutional), with id. at *5 (Guy, J.,
concurring) (expressing "serious reservations" about the constitutionality of the regulation).
23. See Innovative Database Syss., 990 F.2d at 217; Amelkin, 168 F.3d at 902. The Fifth
Circuit subsequently upheld a law that prohibited the release of accident reports for 180 days
from the date of an accident, along with a thirty day ban on professional solicitation. See Moore
v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995)). The case, however, did not address the constitutionality of a permanent ban on certain
types of commercial use.
24. See DeSalvo, 624 So.2d at 901; Walker, 466 S.E.2d at 348.
1999] 1425
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suggests that the problem could be solved by either eliminating public
access to sensitive information through temporary limits on commer-
cial access, or by restricting the undesirable activities themselves,
rather than indirectly regulating such activities by restricting com-
mercial use of information in public law enforcement records.
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Initially, the Supreme Court treated government regulation of
commercial speech as a valid exercise of the states' power to regulate
economic activity.2 5 However, the Court later reversed its position in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council by placing commercial speech under the protection of the
First Amendment. 26 In that case, the Court found that the state's
interest in upholding the professionalism of licensed pharmacists was
outweighed by consumers' interest in the "free flow of commercial
information. 2 7 The Court noted that consumers used the dissemi-
nation of information in advertising to make intelligent and informed
economic decisions.28 The Court indicated, however, that commercial
speech would be afforded less protection than other types of speech in
order "to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information is unimpaired. '29 To justify the lower level of protection,
the Court differentiated commercial speech from other protected
speech in several ways. 30 First, commercial speech was normally
more "objective" than other types of speech, meaning that its speaker
was able to verify its truth more easily.31 Second, commercial speech
25. Several early cases discussed whether commercial speech warranted First Amend-
ment protection. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Court held that commer-
cial speech was not protected under the First Amendment.. Subsequent cases gradually eroded
this approach. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (weighing the commercial
nature of speech as one factor in evaluating the validity of a government restriction); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that sale of newspapers did not necessarily turn
an advertisement soliciting financial support for a political cause into commercial speech).
26. Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). In holding that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, the
Court in Virginia Board rejected the reasoning in Valentine. Id. at 765. See also Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995) (noting that Virginia Board repudiated Valentine's
holding that the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech).
27. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 763.
28. See id. at 765.
29. Id. at 772 n.24.
30. See id.
31. See id. The Court has explained that commercial speakers are well-situated to evalu-
ate the accuracy and lawfulness of their messages because they generally have extensive
1426 [Vol. 52:1421
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was less likely to be "chilled" by restrictions because the speaker
normally had substantial economic incentives to enter the speech into
the marketplace of ideas.3 2
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, the Court articulated a four-part test to determine
whether government restrictions on commercial speech violated the
First Amendment.33 As a threshold question, to qualify for protection
the speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.34
Next, the interests asserted by the government must be substantial.35
If both conditions are satisfied, then the court must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the asserted interests.3 6
Finally, the restriction must not be more extensive than necessary to
serve the interests.37 In a later case, the Court clarified Central Hud-
son's last requirement, noting that it did not require legislatures to
adopt the least restrictive means of achieving its goals, but rather a
"reasonable fit" between the means chosen and the interests served.38
The Central Hudson analysis has been used in a number of
cases involving professional solicitation. For example, while profes-
knowledge of both the market and their products. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381
(1977).
32. See Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. Courts have also argued that commercial
speakers are motivated by economic self-interest, making their expression not "particularly
susceptible to being crushed by over-broad regulation." Id. For a critique of this reasoning, see
David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 405-11
(1990).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989). The proper level of protec-
tion for commercial speech has been the subject of vigorous debate. Some commentators have
argued that commercial speech should receive the same protection as any other speech. See,
e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech? 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
631-38 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1445-46 (1990);
Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993). At least one Supreme Court
Justice has expressed agreement with this position. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 518-28 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech). Other commentators have claimed that commercial
speech deserves no protection at all. See, e.g., Ronald K. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce
& Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 729-33 (1993); Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries,
Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14
(1979). A discussion of the proper amount of protection to grant commercial speech is beyond
the scope of this Note.
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sional advertising may not be completely banned,3 9 the Supreme
Court has allowed regulation of solicitation depending on the risk of
solicitors overreaching the bounds of ethical conduct and professional
responsibility. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the Court upheld a
complete ban on in-person solicitation by attorneys, an activity with a
high risk of overreaching.40 The Court overturned a similar ban on
targeted direct mail solicitation by attorneys in Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n,41 distinguishing the case from Ohralik because the in-
creased potential for overreaching was absent from direct mailings. In
Edenfield v. Fane, the Court overturned a ban on in-person solicita-
tion by certified public accountants, noting that the potential for
overreaching was significantly lower in nonlegal professions. 42 In the
most recent case regarding attorney solicitation, Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., the Court upheld a thirty day ban on direct solicitation of
accident victims, reasoning that the scope of the restriction was rea-
sonably well tailored to the state's asserted interests.43 The Court
noted that the restriction was not an absolute ban on solicitation,44
and left open several other ways for attorneys to convey their message
to potential clients during the thirty-day waiting period.45
III. RECENT CASE DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COMMERCIAL
USE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS
A. Cases Upholding Restrictions on Commercial
Use of Law Enforcement Records
In Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, the Tenth Circuit held
that states could prohibit the commercial use of law enforcement
records. 46 In that case, a Colorado statute required any person seek-
ing access to criminal justice records to sign an affidavit that the
records would not be used "for the direct solicitation of business for
39. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (invalidating a complete ban on
attorney advertising).
40. Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
41. Shapero v. Kentucky, 486 U.S. 466, 475-76 (1988).
42. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993).
43. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995).
44. See id. at 629.
45. See id. at 633. The Court suggested, for example, advertising in print and broadcast
media, utilizing billboards, sending untargeted mailings, or placing advertisements in telephone
directories. See id.
46. Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994).
1428 [Vol. 52:1421
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pecuniary gain. '47 The records were otherwise available to any mem-
ber of the public.48 The plaintiffs, a law firm serving misdemeanor
DUI clients and a drug and alcohol treatment center, desired to use
the addresses in the public records to engage in direct mail solicita-
tion and advertising.49
The court rejected Colorado's arguments that the case involved
a simple access-to-information issue and thus did not implicate the
First Amendment. 50 The court explained that, while public records
themselves do not constitute speech, the Colorado statute drew a
regulatory line based on the speech use of such information.5' By not
allowing release of the records to those wishing to use the records for
a commercial purpose, while allowing release to noncommercial users,
the statute created a content-based restriction on commercial
speech,52 subject to First Amendment review.53
Applying the Central Hudson test, the Lanphere court found
that the commercial speech in question concerned lawful activity and
was not misleading.54 The court also found that the state had a sub-
stantial interest in protecting the privacy of those charged with mis-
demeanor traffic offenses, in lessening the danger of solicitation
abuse, and in maintaining public confidence in the justice system. 55
47. Id. at 1511 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-305.5 (West 1998)).
48. See § 24-72-304 ("[A]ll criminal justice records... may be open for inspection by any
person at reasonable times, except as otherwise provided by law.").
49. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1510.
50. See id. at 1511-13.
51. See id. at 1513.
52. Unlike many other types of speech, courts have allowed commercial speech to be
regulated on the basis of its content for several reasons. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980). See also supra notes 30-32 and accompa-
nying text. First, commercial speakers are well-situated to evaluate the accuracy and lawful-
ness of their messages because they generally have extensive knowledge of both the market and
their products. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381. Courts have also argued that com-
mercial speakers are motivated by economic self-interest, making their expression not "par-
ticularly susceptible to being crushed by over-broad regulation." Id. For a critique of this
reasoning, see David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV.
359, 405-11 (1990).
53. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1513.
54. See id. at 1514 (noting that the regulation restricted all commercial solicitations, not
merely misleading ones, and thus was subject to First Amendment analysis).
55. See id. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had found no sufficient privacy interest
in a ban on targeted direct mail solicitation, reasoning that the invasion of privacy occurred
when the attorney discovered the accused's legal affairs rather than when the attorney con-
fronted the accused with the discovery. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476
(1988). The Lanphere court held that the Colorado statute prevented such an invasion. See
Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1514.
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After determining that the restrictions met the two threshold re-
quirements of the Central Hudson test, the court found that the Colo-
rado statute advanced the asserted interests in a "reasonably direct"
way.56 Finally, the court discussed whether the regulation was more
extensive than necessary to serve the state's interests. 57 The court
found that the regulation constituted a "reasonable fit" in light of the
asserted state interests.58 The Lanphere court distinguished the
Colorado regulation from the complete ban on direct mail solicitation
invalidated in Shapero in several ways.59 The court observed that the
Colorado regulation protected privacy by preventing solicitors from
obtaining information, unlike in Shapero, where solicitors had already
obtained the information. 60 In addition, the Colorado regulation did
not completely ban direct mail solicitation, but merely established an
indirect barrier by not making certain records available for that pur-
pose.61 Finally, the court noted that the state was not required to
provide access to law enforcement records at all.62  The Lanphere
court thus found that the Colorado statute, though a content-based
restriction on commercial speech, was valid under the Central Hudson
framework. 63
Several other courts have upheld similar restrictions on com-
mercial use of law enforcement records, though not under the com-
56. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1515. The Lanphere court, however, provided little analysis
in support of this conclusion. The court noted that the state's asserted privacy interest was
served despite availability of the information through other sources, such as local newspapers,
because the plaintiffs would not be involved in the litigation if the information sought was so
widely available that privacy was no longer at issue. See id. at 1514. However, this assertion
fails to address whether or not the privacy interest is directly advanced by the restrictions. The
plaintiffs brought the action not because the information was completely unavailable, but
because the statute greatly increased the economic cost of obtaining the information. Privacy
may be violated without economic cost. For example, when a party accesses the law enforce-
ment records for noncommercial purposes, the statute may still fail to directly advance the
accused's privacy interests. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.3.
57. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1515.
58. Id. The court noted that the "reasonable fit" requirement did not mandate that
government select the least restrictive means necessary to accomplish the interests. Id. (quot-
ing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989)).
59. See id. But see discussion infra Part IV.B.3-4.
60. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1515.
61. See id. The Supreme Court has noted that complete bans on commercial speech
should be scrutinized more carefully than partial bans. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980).
62. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1516. The court observed that while the state's discretion
did not render the First Amendment inapplicable,.the discretion was relevant to a reasonable fit
analysis. Id. (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (stating that because
access to information in the discovery process is "a matter of legislative grace," some continued
control over that information by the court "does not raise the same specter of government
censorship that such control might [otherwise] suggest')).
63. See id.
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mercial speech analysis utilized in Lanphere. In DeSalvo v. Louisi-
ana, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that a statute denying com-
mercial access to accident reports did not infringe upon the plaintiffs'
commercial speech rights, but rather was valid as a reasonable time,
place or manner regulation. 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court
took a different approach, holding that a restriction on disclosure of
accident reports did not implicate the First Amendment at all.65 The
South Carolina Supreme Court then upheld the restrictions under a
due process analysis. 66
B. Cases Invalidating Restrictions on Commercial
Use of Law Enforcement Records
Several courts have disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's conclu-
sions in Lanphere. The Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar restriction
on commercial use of law enforcement records in United Reporting
Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol.6 7 The California
statute at issue prohibited the use of arrestee addresses obtained
from public law enforcement records "to sell a product or service to
any individual or group of individuals.168 After determining that the
sale of arrestee addresses to potential solicitors was commercial
speech,69 the court applied the Central Hudson analysis to the restric-
tions.70  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
state's interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees was substan-
64. DeSalvo v. Louisiana, 624 So.2d 897, 898-99 (La. 1993). The DeSalvo court's reason-
ing was questionable in light of the Supreme Court's decision regarding time, place or manner
restrictions on commercial speech in Discovery Network earlier that year. The Discovery
Network Court rejected an argument that a restriction based solely on the commercial nature of
the speech was a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. See City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993) (overturning law banning newsracks con-
taining commercial handbills but allowing newsracks containing newspapers); see also infra
notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
65. See Walker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346, 347
(S.C. 1995). The Walker court claimed that the statute only regulated access to information.
See id. at 348. But see discussion infra Part V.A.
66. See Walker, 466 S.E.2d at 348.
67. United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. California Highway Patrol (United Reporting II), 146
F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom., Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting
Publ'g Corp., 119 S.Ct. 901 (1999).
68. Id. at 1135 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(0(3) (West 1998)).
69. See id. at 1136-37.
70. See id.
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tial.71 The court held, however, that the statute failed to advance the
privacy interest in a "direct and material way"72 because noncommer-
cial users could still access the information without restriction.7 3
While the statute hindered solicitation practices, the court observed
that several other courts had found no invasion of privacy in direct
mail solicitation.74 The court argued that publication of an arrestee's
information in a newspaper, which the statute allowed, was a greater
affront to privacy than receiving letters from professionals offering
their services.7 5 As the statute did not directly advance the state's
interests, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision to
strike down the statute as an unconstitutional infringement of First
Amendment rights.7 6 The court did not reach the fourth part of the
Central Hudson test, which asks whether the restrictions were not
more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted interests.77
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in United Reporting II drew upon
the reasoning in several previous decisions from other circuits. In
Innovative Database Systems, Inc. v. Morales, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed a lower court decision that a statute prohibiting use of infor-
mation from publicly available law enforcement records to contact
crime victims or people involved in motor vehicle accidents was an
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.78 The court found
that the restriction was too extensive to pass the fourth prong of
Central Hudson.7 9 The court likewise invalidated a statute prohibit-
ing any solicitation of accident victims by chiropractors.8 0 The court
was unconvinced that a complete ban on solicitation using law en-
forcement information was a sufficiently tailored means to promote
professional ethical standards, to prevent fraud and misrepresenta-
71. See id. The parties agreed that the speech at issue was neither illegal nor misleading
under Central Hudson's first prong. See id.
72. Id. at 1138 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
73. See id. at 1139.
74. See id. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)).
75. See id. at 1140.
76. Id. Recently, another court came to the same conclusion regarding a Rhode Island law
prohibiting commercial use of any public record kept by the state government. See Rhode Island
Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 51 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113-14 (D.R.I. 1999). At least one
court has reached a similar result under a state constitutional provision. See Zackheim v.
Forbes, 895 P.2d 793, 796-97 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
77. See United Reporting II, 146 F.3d at 1140 n.5.
78. See Innovative Database Syss. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 218 (5th Cir. 1993) affig Order
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, No.3:91-CV-1663-T (N.D. Tex. 1992). The
Fifth Circuit opinion adopted the district court's reasoning in its entirety, adding no additional
reasoning of its own.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 222.
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tion, or to protect the public from inflated interest rates to pass scru-
tiny under the fourth part of Central Hudson.8'
In Speer v. Miller, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Georgia
statute prohibiting inspection of law enforcement records for commer-
cial solicitation violated First Amendment commercial speech rights.8 2
Observing that the statute "probably impinges upon.., commercial
speech," the court of appeals reversed a lower court decision denying a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute.83
On remand, the district court considered whether the statute
restricted speech, or was merely a denial of access to a government
commodity.8 4  The district court rejected an interpretation of the
statute as merely denying access to a government commodity or with-
drawal of a government benefit.85 Rather, it noted that enforcement
of the statute was triggered only by speech using the records rather
than the act of accessing the information. 6 This imposition of a
criminal punishment for certain speech implicated First Amendment
protection.8 7
Having determined that the Georgia statute restricted com-
mercial speech, the district court applied the Central Hudson test.8
The court found that the plaintiffs proposed use of the records was
neither false, deceptive, nor misleading.8 9 Also, the court held that
the asserted government interests in protecting the privacy of the
accused, protecting against unnecessary insurance abuses, and mini-
mizing opportunities for fraud and misrepresentation were substan-
tial enough to warrant further analysis under Central Hudson.90
81. See id. at 221.
82. Speer v. Miller (Speer 1), 15 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (11th Cir. 1994).
83. Id. The court of appeals provided only limited analysis of its conclusions. However,
the district court on remand provided a substantial discussion of the commercial speech issues
in the case. See Speer v. Miller (Speer I), 864 F. Supp. 1294, 1296-1302 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
84. See Speer II, 864 F. Supp. at 1297-99. The district court noted that, while the court of
appeals cited several cases involving statutes and professional regulations that limited dissemi-
nation of information, none of those cases had discussed restrictions on access to information.
See id. Also, the courts in professional regulation cases had conceded that speech was being
regulated. Thus, the Speer I court felt it necessary to analyze whether First Amendment
values were implicated. Id.
85. See id. at 1297-98.
86. See id. at 1298-99 (citing Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th
Cir. 1994)).
87. See id. at 1298-99.
88. See id. at 1299.
89. See id. at 1299-1300.
90. See id.
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Nevertheless, the district court found that the restriction on commer-
cial use of law enforcement records did not directly advance the as-
serted government interests in preventing insurance abuses, fraud,
and misrepresentation.61 Disagreeing with Lanphere, the court also
held that the statute did not directly advance the government's inter-
est in protecting arrestee privacy.92 The court observed that previous
decisions had found that statutes restricting use of government in-
formation did not protect privacy interests, because the invasion of
privacy had already occurred with the initial access to the informa-
tion.93 Finding that the statute prevented only solicitation rather
than solicitors' actual discovery of information, the court held that the
statute failed to advance the asserted interests significantly enough to
pass muster under Central Hudson.94
More recently, the Sixth Circuit invalidated several restric-
tions on access to accident reports for commercial purposes in Amel-
kin v. McClure.9 5 One statute prohibited access to accident reports to
anyone except parties involved in the accident, the parties' insurers,
and the parties' attorneys.9 6 The statute, however, allowed an excep-
tion for any "news-gathering organization" to publish or broadcast
accident report information in the news.97 The news-gathering or-
ganization was prohibited from using or allowing use of the informa-
tion for commercial purposes.98 The court held that the exceptions for
media use of the accident report information prevented the statute
from directly and materially advancing the government's interests in
91. See id. at 1300-01. The court noted that the government provided three affidavits
from individuals "familiar with insurance fraud in the state of Georgia" and offered only "con-
clusory claims" that the statute directly advanced these interests. Id.
92. See id. While the reasoning on this point was furnished by the district court on
remand, the court of appeals made the initial determination in its earlier opinion. See Speer v.
Miller (Speer 1), 15 F.3d 1007, 1011 n.7 (11th Cir. 1994) ("We note that any privacy arguments
the state asserts are disingenuous in light of the fact that the statute carves out an exception for
the media to place any information they can obtain on the front page of any newspaper in
Georgia.").
93. See Speer I, 864 F. Supp. at 1301 (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S.
466, 476 (1988)); McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1044 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom.,
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995)).
94. See Speer II, 864 F. Supp. at 1302. The court stated its belief that Central Hudson's
"direct advancement" requirement did not include statutes that were "so riddled with excep-
tions" as to provide only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. Id. (quot-
ing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) ("TIhe
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the govern-
ment's purpose.')).
95. Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 1999).
96. See id. at 896-97 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.635 (Banks-Baldwin 1995)).
97. Id.
98. See id. The law specifically allows the news media to broadcast or publish accident
report information since it is outside of the statutory definition of "commercial purposes." Id.
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protecting the privacy of accident victims from unwanted intrusions.99
Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's analysis in United Reporting II, the
Amelkin court found that the exception for media use tended to "di-
rectly undermine and counteract" any attempts to protect privacy.100
Thus, the exception prevented the statute from achieving a reason-
able fit between its ends and the means it used to reach them, making
the statute an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech.101
IV. LIMITATIONS ON COMMERCIAL USE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
RECORDS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Laws that Restrict Access to Public Law Enforcement Records for
Commercial Use Implicate Commercial Speech Rights
For bans on commercial use of public information in law en-
forcement records 10 2 to implicate the First Amendment, the regula-
tions must restrict the expression of protected speech in some way.
Unlike the direct restrictions on solicitation at issue in cases like
Shapero0 3 and Florida Bar,0 4 restrictions on potential solicitors'
access to law enforcement information seek to indirectly regulate
solicitation. In fact, some courts have held that these restrictions do
not constrain commercial speech at all, 0 5 or that they are reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions on commercial speech. 0 6 Unfor-
99. See id. at 899-900. The court stated that "[t]here is no rational basis for a statute
which purports to advance the government interest in protecting the privacy of accident victims
to allow their names and addresses to be published or broadcast to the general public." Id. at
900.
100. Id. at 900 (citing Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 476; Valley Broad. Co. v. United States,
107 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1994)).
101. The court also considered the constitutionality of a statute allowing a state agency to
set a "reasonable fee" for making copies of public accident reports. Id. at 897 (quoting KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 61.874 (Banks-Baldwin 1997)). The plaintiffs claimed that the agency set the fees
to make them prohibitively expensive for commercial users. See id. at 901. The plaintiffs' brief
alleged that costs rose from $0.10 per page to $40 per report for non-injury accidents, $90 per
report for injury accidents, and $230 per report for fatal accident reports. See id. For one of the
plaintiffs this raised the cost of two weeks worth of reports from $68 to approximately $17,650.
See id. The court remanded the issue to the district court for findings of fact on whether the
state agency had applied these fees in a discriminatory manner. See id. at 902.
102. See supra note 1.
103. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 469-70 (1988).
104. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620-21 (1994).
105. See, e.g., Walker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346
(S.C. 1995).
106. See, e.g., DeSalvo v. Louisiana, 624 So.2d 897 (La. 1993).
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tunately, such holdings fail to recognize that the triggering provisions
of the laws are de facto limitations on protected commercial speech. 107
Where the right of access to law enforcement records has been
statutorily limited, individuals may only gain access to the records if
some constitutional right overrides the state law. 08 Accordingly,
statutes restricting commercial use of law enforcement records will
prevent would-be solicitors from examining the information unless
the statutes infringe upon the First Amendment. 10 9 There is, how-
ever, no general First Amendment right for individuals to access
public records. 10 Constitutionally, the public is not entitled to gov-
ernment-held information, except that the government may not re-
strain the public or the press from communicating information that
they have already acquired."'
In the restrictions at issue, state legislatures have granted
public access to the information in law enforcement records. 112
Though the states may withdraw public access to law enforcement
107. See infra Part IV.C.
108. See United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822, 825 (S.D. Cal. 1996),
affd sub nom., United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. California Highway Patrol (United Reporting
I), 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom., Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United
Reporting Publ'g Corp., 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
109. Some solicitors have argued that the restrictions are invalid under the First Amend-
ment as it relates to the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21
F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994). Though in certain circumstances a First Amendment right of
access is implicated in relation to the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and public trial, the right
of access inheres only in situations where the criminal records have traditionally been accessi-
ble. See id. (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)). As the court in
Lanphere points out, the law enforcement records discussed in this Note have not been tradi-
tionally accessible to the public. See id. ('To hold that [Sixth Amendment] principles provide for
access to any criminal justice record ... would stretch them well beyond their current bounds.').
110. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). Two exceptions to this rule exist.
First, courts have defined a constitutional right to public access to criminal trials and court
proceedings. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-78 (1980) ("In
guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those guarantees.").
Second, courts have found a First Amendment right of access to judicial records. See United
Reporting II, 946 F. Supp. at 825 n.1 (citing United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th
Cir. 1985) (finding a common law right to inspect and copy judicial records)). Nevertheless,
courts have generally rejected these arguments in the context of commercial use of law en-
forcement records. See, e.g., Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1512; United Reporting I, 946 F. Supp. at 825
n.1. But see Walker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346, 348
(S.C. 1995) (holding that the statute merely restricts access and does not implicate commercial
speech rights).
111. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 10. The reasoning behind the rule was that "[the Constitu-
tion ... establishes the contest, not its resolution. [State legislatures] may provide a resolution
... through carefully drawn legislation." Id. at 14-15 (quoting Hon. Potter Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631, 636 (1975)). See also United Reporting II, 946 F. Supp. at 825.
112. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1513.
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records at any time, the restrictions should be subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny.11 3
Although the law enforcement records themselves do not con-
stitute protected commercial speech, the restrictions on access draw a
regulatory line based on the intended speech use of the records which
implicates the First Amendment.114  As the district court noted in
Speer II, "the operative act of accessing the information does not give
rise to culpability until the actor utilizes.., the information in cer-
tain speech activities (i.e. soliciting business.)"11 5 Thus, the restric-
tions do not penalize individuals who seek access to the law enforce-
ment records until the individuals act in a certain manner, by utiliz-
ing the information in the records to facilitate commercial solicitation.
Because solicitation falls within the commercial speech activities
protected by the First Amendment,16 the limitations on access to
public law enforcement records create restrictions on protected
speech.117
113. See id. at 1512 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). States may not
disregard free speech protections simply because the practice in question is a privilege rather
than an absolute right. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410
(1993) (holding that, even presuming the city could completely prohibit the use of newsracks on
public property, any content-based regulation of newsracks is still subject to First Amendment
scrutiny). But see Lyng v. International Union, United Auto. Workers, 485 U.S. 360 (1988)
(holding that law excluding any household of which a member is on strike from participation in
the food stamp program does not violate the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
or association). The Court found that this denial of access to a desired government commodity
did not "significantly" interfere with the exercise of freedom of association, though the denial of
food stamps to striking workers could "exert[ ] pressure on them to abandon their union." Id. at
368. One court has rejected this argument in the context of restrictions on commercial use of
law enforcement records because the laws impose a criminal punishment rather than merely
withdrawing a government benefit. See Speer v. Miller (Speer 11), 864 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (N.D.
Ga. 1994); see also Lyng, 485 U.S. at 367 n.5 (noting that exposure to civil or criminal penalties
based on membership in an organization is more dangerous to the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms than the temporary withdrawal of government benefits for the duration of one of the
organization's activities).
114. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1513.
115. Speer I, 864 F. Supp. at 1298.
116. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988).
117. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1513; accord Speer v. Miller (Speer 1), 15 F.3d 1007, 1010
(11th Cir. 1994) (noting, without analysis, that the restriction "probably impinges upon [the
plaintiffs] commercial speech"); United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822,
825 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that the restrictions limit access in order to allow the government
to limit speech on the basis of its content).
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B. As Restrictions on Commercial Speech, Prohibitions on
Commercial Use of Information in Law Enforcement
Records Are Unconstitutional Under Central Hudson
1. Truthful Direct Mail Solicitation Using Information from Public
Law Enforcement Records is Lawful and Not Misleading
The regulations at issue prohibit the acquisition of addresses
from public records by a variety of professionals for commercial use in
direct mail solicitation. As noted above, advertising for the services of
attorneys and other professionals, particularly in the form of direct
mail solicitation,18 is commercial speech protected under the First
Amendment." 9 No court that has considered the constitutionality of
regulations on commercial use of law enforcement records under
Central Hudson has disputed that the commercial activities in ques-
tion were lawful and not misleading. 20
118. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (invalidating ban on in-person solicita-
tion by certified public accountants); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476 (invalidating complete ban on
direct mail solicitation by attorneys on First Amendment grounds); Silverman v. Walkup, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (invalidating ban on solicitation by licensed chiropractors);
Gregory v. Louisiana Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 608 So.2d 987 (La. 1992) (invalidating ban on
chiropractor solicitation).
119. Even if restrictions on commercial use of law enforcement records do not violate
solicitors' commercial speech rights under the federal Constitution, the statutes, as they pertain
to attorney conduct, still could violate separation of powers between the legislature and the
judiciary under state constitutions. If the implicit purpose of the restrictions is to limit attorney
solicitation, then the statutes are a legislative attempt to regulate the practice of law. See
DeSalvo v. Louisiana, 624 So.2d 897, 903 (La. 1993) (Kimbell, J., dissenting). In many states,
the state constitution grants the judiciary an exclusive inherent power to regulate the practice
of law within the state. For example, the Louisiana Constitution gives the state judiciary the
inherent power to regulate the practice of law. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(B); see also O'Rourke
v. Cairns, 683 So.2d 697, 700 (La. 1996); Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n, 378 So.2d 423, 425-26 (La. 1979). This is also the case in each state in which a
federal court has decided the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial access to law
enforcement records. See, e.g, Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar, 888 F. Supp. 1328,
1334 (E.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967
P.2d 49, 60 (Ca. 1998) (noting that although the legislature created the state bar, "the State Bar
is a constitutional entity subject to [the state judiciary's] expressly reserved power over admis-
sion and discipline"); Colorado v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386, 390 (Colo. 1997); Wallace v. State Bar, 486
S.E.2d 165, 166 (Ga. 1997); Horn v. Kentucky, 916 S.W. 2d 173, 176 (Ky. 1995); Thus, any
legislative attempt to regulate the practice of law, including indirect restrictions on attorney
solicitation, would encroach upon the powers expressly reserved to the state judiciary. The
issue of separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary would vary from state to
state, and would only invalidate the restrictions insofar as they seek to regulate solicitation by
attorneys rather than other professions.
120. See, e.g., Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 1999); United Reporting Publ'g
Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1998); Lanphere, 21 F.3d at
1514 (noting that the regulation restricted all commercial use, not just unlawful or misleading
use); Speer II, 864 F. Supp. at 1299-1300.
1999] PROTECTING PRIVACY 1439
2. The States' Interests in Preserving the Privacy of Citizens and
Reducing the Possibility of Solicitation Abuse are Substantial
Similarly, most courts have found that the asserted govern-
mental interests in restricting the commercial use of law enforcement
records are substantial. 121  The most common interest asserted has
been in preserving the privacy of citizens by not aiding in the dis-
semination of information for commercial purposes. 122 States have
also explained that the restrictions on the commercial use of law
enforcement records serve as a way to lessen the dangers of solicita-
tion abuse, including fraud and misrepresentation. 123  Reducing this
abuse, states have argued, helps to maintain and promote standards
of ethical conduct 24 and encourages public confidence in the justice
system. 25 Finally, at least one state has asserted an interest in
minimizing the costs of producing arrestee information. 26
121. See, e.g., Amelkin, 168 F.3d at XXX; United Reporting, 146 F.3d at 1137; Lanphere, 21
F.3d at 1514-15; Speer II, 864 F. Supp. at 1300.
122. At least one court has noted that the state's interest in protecting citizens' privacy by
not aiding the dissemination of information for commercial purposes remains despite the
availability of other sources of information.
[E]ven if the information is available to some degree from other sources, the
state's interest in not aiding the dissemination of the information . . . re-
mains. We presume that plaintiffs would not be involved in this litigation if
the information... is so widely available that the privacy of the accused is
no longer at issue.
Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1514.
123. See Speer II, 864 F. Supp. at 1300.
124. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (quoting Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (noting the state's broad power to regulate the
practice of professionals)); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (finding that maintaining
professional ethical standards is a substantial state interest).
125. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1514 n.4. The court noted that this interest applies whether
the information is used by attorneys or non-attorneys because the source of the information
rather than the user of the information reflects on the integrity of the justice system in main-
taining the confidentiality of private citizens.
126. See United Reporting Pubrg Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822, 826 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
Some courts have held that this interest may be satisfied without restricting speech if the
commercial users pay the costs of producing the information. See, e.g., Transportation Info.
Servs., Inc. v. Oklahoma Dep't of Corrections, 970 P.2d 166 (Okla. 1998) (holding that a private
corporation is entitled to public offender records where corporation is prepared to pay reason-
able costs incurred in assembling the information) cf. Amelkin, 168 F.3d at 902 (implying that a
statute requiring commercial users to pay reasonable costs of assembling data is an acceptable
restriction of commercial speech).
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3. Restrictions on Commercial Use of Public Law Enforcement
Records Do Not Directly Advance the States' Asserted Interests
The government bears the burden of showing not only that the
recited harms are real, but also that the regulation will alleviate them
"to a material degree."127 "[M]ere speculation and conjecture" will not
satisfy this burden.128 However, the numerous exceptions in the laws
for public, noncommercial access to public records prevent the laws
from directly advancing the asserted state interests. A commercial
speech regulation "may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective
or remote support for the government's purpose.' 29
In passing the restrictions on commercial use of information in
public law enforcement records, the states' main asserted interest is
to preserve individuals' privacy. 30 The states do not wish to aid in
the dissemination of information for commercial purposes in part
because they do not wish to facilitate direct mail solicitation.' 31 Ac-
cording to the states, such solicitation constitutes a "direct intrusion
into the private lives and homes of arrestees and victims.
132
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that direct
mail solicitation is an insufficient invasion of privacy to exempt such
speech from First Amendment protection. 33 In addition, the Supreme
Court has rejected privacy arguments justifying complete bans on
direct mail solicitation. 13 4  It observed that the invasion of privacy
127. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S.
at 771).
128. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995).
129. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
130. See, e.g., Amelkin, 168 F.3d at 898; United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. California
Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998); Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1514; Speer v. Miller
(Speer I1), 864 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
131. See Amelkin, 168 F.3d at 901 (observing that restrictions on commercial access to
accident reports are aimed at reducing direct mail solicitation practices); Babkes v. Satz, 944 F.
Supp. 909, 913 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (analyzing the government's asserted interest in not aiding the
commercial dissemination of law enforcement record information); Speer II, 864 F. Supp. at
1302 (concluding that the narrow scope of the restriction reveals its purpose to prevent solici-
tous practices rather than to protect privacy).
132. United Reporting, 146 F.3d at 1138-39.
133. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (invalidating ban on
unsolicited commercial mailings concerning contraceptives). The Bolger Court rejected the
government's argument that recipients of direct mailings were "captive audiences" that could
not avoid objectionable speech. Id. Suggesting that individuals could avoid material that they
found offensive by "averting their eyes," the Court stated that the "short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can.., is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned." Id. (citations omitted). See also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S.
466, 475-76 (1988) ("A letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be
put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded.').
134. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476; see also Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir.
1997) (invalidating thirty-day ban on direct mailings to recent arrestees).
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occurs when the solicitor originally discovers the recipient's private
legal affairs, not when the unsolicited letter is received. 135 Bans on
commercial use of law enforcement information fail to protect privacy
effectively because anyone, including solicitors, may still access the
information for noncommercial purposes. 36 In addition, the laws do
not restrict noncommercial dissemination of the information in any
way, including publishing the details of individuals' "private legal
affairs" in the local press. 137 Mass publication of "private information"
in the media is a far greater affront to privacy than a discreet letter
sent to an individual's home.13  Therefore, by exposing individuals to
more egregious invasions of privacy, the restrictions fail to directly or
materially advance the states' asserted interests in protecting indi-
viduals' privacy. 139
To justify restrictions on commercial use of law enforcement
records, states have also advanced interests in maintaining and pro-
moting standards of ethical conduct and encouraging public confi-
dence in the justice system. The states argue that prohibiting com-
mercial use of public information restricts solicitation and its abuse. 40
Restricting access to law enforcement records forces solicitors to
spend more time and resources locating potential clients. This less-
ens the danger of overreaching by solicitors when recipients may be
particularly vulnerable from the mental and/or physical stress of the
135. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
136. See United Reporting, 146 F.3d at 1139 ('The fact that ... noncommercial users may
peruse and report on arrestee records . . .belies the [government's] claim that the statute is
actually intended to protect the privacy interests of arrestees.'). But see Lanphere, 21 F.3d at
1515 (asserting, without analysis, that the restrictions protect privacy through prohibition of
commercial access).
137. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(0(3) (West 1998) (exception for requests made for a
"scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purpose); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.635(b)
(Banks.Baldwin 1996) (stating that media publications are specifically exempted from definition
of "commercial purpose" prohibited in statute).
138. See Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1011 n.7 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that privacy
arguments were disingenuous in light of the statutory exception allowing "the media to place
any information they obtain on the front page of any newspaper in Georgia).
139. See Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir. 1999); United Reporting, 146 F.3d
at 1140; Innovative Database Syss. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the statute "goes too far in attempting to achieve its stated goal"); Speer v. Miller, 864 F. Supp.
1294, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 1994). But see Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1515.
140. See Lanphere, 21 F.3d at 1515.
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incident. 141  Courts have accepted that the regulations directly ad-
vance this asserted interest. 42
In addition, several states have asserted an interest in mini-
mizing the additional costs incurred from assembling law enforcement
information for commercial use.' 43 While courts have deemed saving
public funds a substantial interest,144 a ban on the commercial use of
law enforcement records does not directly advance this goal.145 First,
the costs incurred are generally minimal, since the government has
already compiled the information for public use. 46 Second, the state
could require commercial users to pay for any additional charges that
the duplication or further processing of the information generates. 147
In any event, these charges should reflect the actual cost of generat-
ing the information, 48 and they may not be used as a de facto barrier
to commercial access. 149
4. Exceptions for Public and Media Access to Law Enforcement
Records Prevent Restrictions on Commercial Use from
Achieving a Reasonable Fit Between Means and Goals
Numerous alternatives would more effectively serve the states'
asserted interests while reducing burdens on commercial speech. 50
Although states are not required to select the least restrictive alterna-
141. See id.
142. See id. Even disregarding the argument that these regulations hinder honest solici-
tors as much as their overreaching counterparts, the interest in discouraging overreaching does
not justify the restrictions under Central Hudson because the restrictions do not achieve a
reasonable fit between the means chosen and the interests served. See infra Part IV.4.
143. See, e.g., United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Lungren (United Reporting D), 946 F. Supp.
822, 826 (S.D. Cal. 1996). Cf. Transportation Info. Servs. v. Oklahoma Dep't of Corrections, 970
P.2d 166 (Okla. 1998) (addressing whether additional costs of generating public offender records
for commercial use justified denial of commercial access); Cummings & Assoc. v. Oklahoma
City, 849 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 1993) (considering whether additional resources necessary to gener-
ate traffic collision reports for commercial users warranted denial of commercial access).
144. See, e.g., United Reporting II, 946 F. Supp. at 826.
145. See id. at 827.
146. See id. (noting that the cost savings to the state would be minimal because the state
would have to compile identical data for non-commercial users).
147. See id. (stating that the state could charge any additional costs of duplication to
commercial users).
148. State statutes allowing public agencies to prescribe a fee for gathering public informa-
tion generally require that such fees be reasonable. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.874(3)
(Banks-Baldwin 1995). Reasonable fees reflect only the costs for the compilation, storage, and
upkeep of the records. See Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 1999).
149. See Amelkin, 168 F.3d at 902 (remanding the issue of whether a state agency had set
fees for producing accident reports in order to recoup the state's cost in investigating the
accident rather than only assessing the average cost of compiling the information).
150. For additional solutions, see Part V, infra.
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tive,151 states must demonstrate "a fit between the restriction and the
government interest that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable.' 1 52
The alternatives available to prohibitions on commercial use of law
enforcement records demonstrate that the restrictions are unreasona-
bly extensive. 15 3 In particular, the states could achieve their goal of
discouraging unethical conduct in solicitation without imposing as
substantial a burden on solicitors' commercial speech rights.
To justify restrictions on commercial use of law enforcement
records, states have asserted an interest in maintaining and promot-
ing standards of ethical conduct in commercial solicitation.154 In
Florida Bar, the Court upheld a temporary ban on direct mail solicita-
tion to accomplish the same goal.155  The Florida Bar Association
demonstrated that accident victims were more likely to suffer emo-
tional harm from overreaching in the thirty days following an incident
than in later periods. 15 6 In contrast, prohibitions on commercial use of
law enforcement records permanently deprive commercial users of an
inexpensive and reliable source of essential information. Though the
restrictions do not prohibit solicitation, they impose a heavy burden
on professionals' ability to engage in commercial speech. 157 In addi-
tion, such restrictions do not differentiate effectively between honest
solicitation practices and dishonest ones. 158 Limiting the time period
for solicitation would help balance the restrictions' effectiveness in
preventing dishonest solicitation against honest solicitors' commercial
speech rights. Therefore, direct, but temporary, regulations of solici-
tation would place a significantly lower burden on commercial speech,
and would more efficiently encourage ethical behavior in professional
solicitation.
151. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
152. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993).
153. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) ("[f
there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial
speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends
and means is reasonable.").
154. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 450 (1977) See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
155. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1992).
156. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 626-27.
157. See Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1994).
158. See Speer v. Miller (Speer II), 864 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
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C. Limitations on Use of Information in Law Enforcement Records
Are Unconstitutional under a Time, Place and Manner Analysis
In DeSalvo v. Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
a statute denying commercial users access to accident reports as a
reasonable time, place or manner restriction. 159 The court's reasoning
was flawed for several reasons. The decision rested upon the court's
incorrect conclusion that the restriction was content-neutral. 160  Al-
though not addressed in DeSalvo, the restrictions also could not be
justified as regulations of the "secondary effects" of direct solicita-
tion161 Finally, the only specifically commercial harm that may have
allowed a time, place or manner regulation to distinguish legitimately
between commercial and noncommercial speech, the risk of over-
reaching by solicitors, could be more effectively addressed in the Cen-
tral Hudson analysis. 62
The DeSalvo court found that the restriction on commercial
access to accident reports was content-neutral in that it did not regu-
late the type of messages that solicitors wished to disseminate to
persons identified in the reports. 63 Rather, it restricted all commer-
cial use of the accident report information. 64 Such analysis, however,
is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Discovery
Network earlier that year. 65 In Discovery Network, the Court invali-
dated a restriction that discriminated between publications based
solely on whether commercial or noncommercial speech was contained
within. 166 The Court found that the city's asserted reason for the
restriction 167 was content-neutral, but that the regulation did not
address a distinctively commercial harm to justify the discrimination
between commercial and noncommercial publications. 68 The news-
159. See DeSalvo v. Louisiana, 624 So.2d 897, 901 (La. 1993).
160. See id. at 900; see infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
161. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (upholding city zoning of
adult businesses based on the "secondary effects" rather than the actual content of the speech);
see also infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
163. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52-53.
164. See id.
165. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (invalidating
ordinance prohibiting newsracks containing commercial handbills but allowing the same
newsracks to carry newspapers, where city wished to reduce the number of newsracks for
aesthetic purposes).
166. See id. at 429 ('The [content-neutrality] argument is unpersuasive because the very
basis for the regulation is the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commer-
cial speech.').
167. The city wished to reduce the number of newsracks in order to ensure that sidewalks
were safe and more aesthetically pleasing. See id. at 415 n.8.
168. See id. at 429.
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racks containing commercial handbills were no less aesthetically
pleasing than newsracks containing noncommercial newspapers. 169
The city's actual basis for the distinction was its assertion of the "low
value" of commercial speech as compared with noncommercial
speech.170 Since the city's discrimination between commercial and
noncommercial speech was not content-neutral, the court would not
allow the restriction to be considered a time, place or manner restric-
tion.171
Similarly, restrictions on commercial use of law enforcement
records are not content-neutral because the restrictions distinguish
between commercial and noncommercial use of the information with-
out addressing a specifically commercial harm. Although the states
assert an interest in protecting individuals' privacy, allowing non-
commercial use of the information, particularly by the news media,
violates individuals' privacy.172 Also, the asserted interest in reducing
the cost of producing these records is not a specifically commercial
harm as the same costs will be incurred in producing the information
for noncommercial users. 173
This argument is similar to the Court's reasoning in Discovery
Network, where it rejected the city's argument that the ordinance was
motivated by concerns about the "secondary effects" of newsracks
containing commercial handbills.1 74 The Court stated that any "sec-
ondary effects" of the newsracks containing handbills would be identi-
cal to the effects of newsracks containing newspapers.1 75 As restric-
tions on commercial use of law enforcement records do not advance
the states' interests in preserving privacy and preventing unnecessary
costs any more than noncommercial use of the information, 7 6 the
restrictions are not justified under a secondary effects argument. 177
169. See id. at 425.
170. Id. at 429.
171. See id. ("[W]hether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined by the
content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus... the ban in this case is content
based. ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
174. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 430 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-53.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 136-39, 143-49 and accompanying text.
177. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 430 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41 (1986)).
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Finally, the states' interest in discouraging solicitors from
overreaching could present a harm specific to commercial users.178
This raises the issue of whether regulations on commercial speech
should ever be analyzed as time, place or manner restrictions that
impermissibly discriminate based on content. In Discovery Network,
the Court did not address whether time, place or manner restrictions
on commercial speech were permissible if they addressed a harm that
noncommercial speech did not implicate. 79 Any time, place or man-
ner restriction addressing a specific commercial ,harm, however, must
discriminate between the contents of various commercial speakers. 80
While such content-based restrictions are impermissible under a time,
place or manner analysis, legislatures have been permitted to enact
content-based restrictions on commercial speech.' 81  The Central
Hudson test then determines whether such restrictions are accept-
able.182 This may explain why Central Hudson looks so similar to a
time, place or manner analysis, 183 and why time, place or manner
arguments have not been addressed in recent cases addressing the
problem of overreaching by solicitors. 84
V. LAWS LIMITING THE COMMERCIAL USE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO SOLICITATION ITSELF, NOT TO THE
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
Legislators could solve the problems presented by restrictions
on commercial use of law enforcement records in several ways. First,
states could completely eliminate public access to certain types of law
enforcement records, without exceptions for the media or other non-
commercial public users. State legislators probably would not wish to
accept this solution, since it would confound the legislators' interest in
allowing the media to communicate newsworthy incidents to the
general public.
178. This argument could still fail under a state separation of powers analysis insofar as it
relates to attorney solicitation. See discussion infra Part V.
179. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428-430.
180. For example, regulations prohibiting certain solicitation practices discriminate
between speech that contains the disfavored solicitation and speech that does not.
181. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
182. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
183. See Elisabeth Alden Longworthy, Note, Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions on
Commercial Speech, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 127, 137-38 (1983) (discussing the similarities
between Central Hudson and the traditional time, place or manner analysis).
184. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761 (1993).
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In the alternative, states could restrict commercial use of law
enforcement records for definite periods rather than on a permanent
basis. 185 Similar to the waiting period in Florida Bar,186 denying
commercial access for a specified period would encourage profession-
als to wait until arrestees and accident victims had recovered suffi-
ciently from the incidents before soliciting their business. This solu-
tion, though, is less effective because the restriction would not pre-
vent all solicitation within the waiting period. 8 7
Finally, state governments could regulate solicitous behavior
directly, rather than through violating professionals' commercial
speech rights in an indirect attempt to make solicitation more diffi-
cult. 188 One approach would be to require professionals to wait to
solicit business until a specified period after an incident. 189 This
approach would address privacy concerns and help to improve public
confidence in the legal system, while avoiding unnecessary inter-
ference with commercial speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in United Re-
porting. Hopefully, the Court will resolve the issue of whether re-
strictions on commercial use of law enforcement records violate solici-
tors' commercial speech rights. As an intersection of commercial
speech rights, personal privacy concerns, and appropriate limitations
on professional solicitation, the complexity of the issue forecasts that
courts will continue to struggle regardless of the outcome in United
Reporting.
States have used restrictions on commercial use of law en-
forcement records as a way to impose indirect and substantial bur-
185. See, e.g., Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing Texas' 180-day
waiting period for commercial access to law enforcement records).
186. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 620.
187. Presumably, solicitors could find other sources of information about potential clients,
albeit not as reliable or inexpensive.
188. "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharma-
cists .... But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms
that competing pharmacists are offering." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1975). Many states, however, will require restrictions on
attorney solicitation to be promulgated through the state judiciary rather than the legislature.
See supra note 119.
189. See, e.g., Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 620; Moore, 63 F.3d at 358.
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dens on solicitation. While the states' interests in protecting their
citizens' privacy and in maintaining ethical standards of professional
conduct are substantial, the numerous exceptions to the restrictions
undermine the states' effectiveness in promoting these goals, and
illustrate the states' true objective of regulating solicitation. These
restrictions are constitutionally invalid because they do not directly
and materially advance the states' interests, nor do they establish the
reasonable fit between ends and means that Central Hudson requires.
The best solution to the problem is for states to regulate solici-
tation directly. States could achieve their goals by placing restrictions
on solicitations rather than limiting the information available to
solicitors. This method would be more effective than restricting com-
mercial use of law enforcement records. It would allow states to
advance privacy interests and discourage overreaching with-out inter-
fering with solicitors' free speech rights under the First Amendment.
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